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Abstract
Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events.
Extending our previous work (Cao & Illing, 2007), this paper analyses the adequate
policy response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk. We analyse the feedback
between lender of last resort policy and incentives of private banks, determining
the aggregate amount of liquidity available. We show that imposing minimum
liquidity standards for banks ex ante are a crucial requirement for sensible lender
of last resort policy. In addition, we analyse the impact of equity requirements and
narrow banking, in the sense that banks are required to hold sufficient liquid funds
so as to pay out in all contingencies. We show that such a policy is strictly inferior
to imposing minimum liquidity standards ex ante combined with lender of last
resort policy.
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The events earlier this month leading up to the acquisition of Bear
Stearns by JP Morgan Chase highlight the importance of liquidity man-
agement in meeting obligations during stressful market conditions. ...
The fate of Bear Stearns was the result of a lack of confidence, not a lack
of capital. ... At all times until its agreement to be acquired by JP Mor-
gan Chase during the weekend, the firm had a capital cushion well above
what is required tomeet supervisory standards calculated using the Basel
II standard.
—Chairman Cox, SEC, Letter to Basel Committee in Support of New
Guidance on Liquidity Management, March 20, 2008
Bear Stearns never ran short of capital. It just could not meet its obliga-
tions. At least that is the view from Washington, where regulators never
stepped in to force the investment bank to reduce its high leverage even
after it became clear Bear was struggling last summer. Instead, the regu-
lators issued repeated reassurances that all was well. Does it sound a little
like a doctor emerging from a funeral to proclaim that he did an excellent
job of treating the late patient?
— Floyd Norris, New York Times, April 4, 2008
1 Introduction
For a long time, presumably starting in 2004, financial markets seemed to
have been awashwith excessive liquidity. But suddenly, in August 2007, liq-
uidity dried out nearly completely as a response to doubts about the quality
of subprime mortgage-backed securities. Despite massive central bank in-
terventions, the liquidity freeze did not melt away, but rather spread slowly
to other markets such as those for auction rate bonds. On March 16th 2008,
the investment bank Bear Sterns which — according to the SEC chairman
— was adequately capitalized even a week before had to be rescued via a
Fed-led takeover by JP Morgan Chase.
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Following the turmoil on financialmarkets, there has been a strong debate
about the adequate policy response. Some have warned that central bank
actions may encourage dangerous moral hazard behaviour of market par-
ticipants in the future. Others instead criticised central banks of responding
far too cautiously. The most prominent voice has been Willem Buiter who
— jointly with Ann Sibert— right from the beginning of the crisis in August
2008 strongly pushed the idea that in times of crises, central banks should
act as market maker of last resort. As adoption of the Bagehot principles
to modern times with globally integrated financial systems, central banks
should actively purchase and sell illiquid private sector securities and so
play a key role in assessing and pricing credit risk. In his FT blog “Mavere-
con”, Willem Buiter stated the intellectual arguments behind such a policy
very clearly on December 13, 2007:
“Liquidity is a public good. It can be managed privately (by hoarding inherently
liquid assets), but it would be socially inefficient for private banks and other
financial institutions to hold liquid assets on their balance sheets in amounts
sufficient to tide them over when markets become disorderly. They are meant to
intermediate short maturity liabilities into long maturity assets and (normally)
liquid liabilities into illiquid assets. Since central banks can create unquestioned
liquidity at the drop of a hat, in any amount and at zero cost, they should be
the liquidity providers of last resort, both as lender of last resort and as market
maker of last resort. There is no moral hazards as long as central banks provide
the liquidity against properly priced collateral, which is in addition subject to
the usual ’liquidity haircuts’ on this fair valuation. The private provision of the
public good of emergency liquidity is wasteful. It’s as simple as that.”
Just the week before the breakdown of Bear Sterns, the Fed seems to have
followed Buiter’s advice and increased lending against illiquid securities
in exchange for Treasury securities on a massive scale. Even though cen-
tral banks are still reluctant to play an active role as market maker (denying
rumours of discussions about the feasibility of mass purchases of mortgage-
backed securities as a possible solution), the prevailing main stream view
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seems to be that there is no moral hazard risk as long as the Bagehot prin-
ciples are followed as best practice in liquidity management.
According to the Bagehot principles, a Lender of Last Resort Policy should
target liquidity provision to the market, but not to specific banks. Central
banks should “lend freely at a high rate against good collateral.”This way,
public liquidity support is supposed to be targeted towards solvent yet
illiquid institutions, since insolvent financial institutions shouldbeunable to
provide adequate collateral to secure lending. This paperwants to challenge
the view that a policy following Bagehot principle does not create moral
hazard. The key point is this view neglects the endogeneity of aggregate
liquidity risk. Starting with Allen & Gale (1998) and Holmstro¨m & Tirole
(1998), there have been quite a few models recently analysing private and
public provision of liquidity. But as far as we know, in all these models
except our companion paper Cao & Illing (2007), aggregate systemic risk is
assumed to be an exogenous probability event.
In Holmstro¨m&Tirole (1998), for instance, liquidity shortages arise when
financial institutions and industrial companies scramble for, and cannot find
the cash required to meet their most urgent needs or undertake their most
valuable projects. They show that credit lines from financial intermediaries
are sufficient for implementing the socially optimal (second-best) allocation,
as long as there is no aggregate uncertainty. In the case of aggregate uncer-
tainty, however, the private sector cannot satisfy its own liquidity needs,
so the existence of liquidity shortages vindicates the injection of liquidity
by the government. In their model, the government can provide (outside)
liquidity by committing future tax income to back up the reimbursements.
In the model of Holmstro¨m & Tirole (1998), the Lender of Last Resort
indeed provides a free lunch: public provision of liquidity in the presence of
aggregate shocks is a pure public good, with nomoral hazard involved. The
reason is that aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events;
there is no endogenous mechanism determining the aggregate amount of
liquidity available. The same holds in Allen & Gale (1998), even though
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they analyse a quite different mechanism for public provision of liquidity:
the adjustment of the price level in an economy with nominal contracts. We
adopt Allen & Gale’s mechanism. But we show that there is no longer a
free lunch when private provision of liquidity affects the likelihood of an
aggregate (systemic) shock.
The basic idea of our model is fairly straightforward: Financial interme-
diaries can choose to invest in more or less (real) liquid assets. We model
illiquidity in the following way: some fraction of projects turns out to be re-
alised late. The aggregate share of late projects is endogenous; it depends on
the incentives of financial intermediaries to invest in risky, illiquid projects.
This endogeneity allows us to capture the feedback from liquidity provi-
sion to risk taking incentives of financial intermediaries. We show that the
anticipation of unconditional central bank liquidity provision will encour-
age excessive risk taking (moral hazard). It turns out that in the absence
of liquidity requirements, there will be overinvestment in risky activities,
creating excessive systemic risk.
In contrast to what the Bagehot principle suggests, unconditional pro-
vision of liquidity to the market (lending of central banks against good
collateral) is exactly the wrong policy: It distorts incentives of banks to pro-
vide the efficient amount of private liquidity. In our model, we concentrate
on pure illiquidity risk: There will never be insolvency unless triggered by
illiquidity (by a bank run). Illiquid projects promise a higher, yet possibly re-
tarded return. Relying on sufficient liquidity provided by the market (or by
the central bank), financial intermediaries are inclined to invest more heav-
ily in high yielding, but illiquid long term projects. Central banks liquidity
provision, helping to prevent bank runs with inefficient early liquidation,
encourages bank to invest more in illiquid assets. At first sight, this seems to
work fine, even if systemic risk increases: After all, public insurance against
aggregate risks should allow agents to undertake more profitable activities
with higher social return. As long as public insurance is a free lunch, there
is nothing wrong with providing such a public good.
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The problem, however, is that due to limited liability some banks will be
encouraged to free ride on liquidity provision. This competition will force
other banks to reduce their efforts for liquidity provision, too. Chuck Prince,
at that time chief executive of Citigroup, stated the dilemma posed in fairly
poetic terms on July 10th 2007 in a (in-) famous interview with Financial
Times 1 :
“When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as
long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.We’re still dancing.”
The dancing banks simply enjoy liquidity provided in good states of
the world and just disappear (go bankrupt) in bad states. The incentive of
financial intermediaries to free ride on liquidity in good states results in
excessively low liquidity in bad states. Even worse: As long as they are
not run, ”dancing” banks can always offer more attractive collateral in bad
states — so they are able to outbid prudent banks in a liquidity crisis. For
that reason, the Bagehot principle, rather than providing correct incentives,
is the wrong medicine in modern times with a shadow banking system
relying on liquidity being provided by other institutions.
This paper extends a model developed in Cao & Illing (2007). In that
paper we did not allow for banks holding equity, so we could not analyse
the impact of equity requirements. As we will show, imposing equity re-
quirements can be inferior even relative to the outcome of a mixed strategy
equilibriumwith free riding (dancing) banks. In contrast, imposing binding
liquidity requirements combined with a strict central bank commitment not
1 The key problem is best captured by the following remark about Citigroup in the
NewYork Times report “TreasuryDept. PlanWouldGive FedWideNewPower”on
March 29, 2008: “Mr. Frank said he realized the need for tighter regulation of Wall Street
firms after a meeting with Charles O. Prince III, then chairman of Citigroup. When Mr.
Frank asked why Citigroup had kept billions of dollars in ‘structured investment vehicles’off
the firm’s balance sheet, he recalled, Mr. Prince responded that Citigroup, as a bank holding
company, would have been at a disadvantage because investment firms can operate with
higher debt and lower capital reserves.”
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to support dancing banks is able to implement the optimal second best out-
come. In our two state model capital requirements turn out to be equivalent
to “narrow banking”(banks being required to hold sufficient equity so as to
be able to pay out demand deposits in all states of the world). So we also
prove that narrow banking is likely to be inferior even relative to a highly
volatile banking system facing strong systemic risk.
Allen & Gale (2007, p 213f) notice that the nature of market failure lead-
ing to systemic liquidity risk is not yet well understood. They argue that
“a careful analysis of the costs and benefits of crises is necessary to under-
stand when intervention is necessary.”In this paper, we try to fill this gap,
providing a cost / benefit analysis of different forms of banking regulation
to better to understand what type of intervention is required. We explicitly
compare the impact both of liquidity and capital requirements. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first paper providing such an analysis.
Our argument also seems to be valid for the modelling approach used
in Goodfriend & McCallum (2007). They introduce a banking sector in the
standard New Keynesian framework to reconsider the role of money and
banking in monetary policy analysis. Goodfriend & McCallum show that
“banking accelerator”transmission effects work via an “external finance
premium.”In their model, the central bank should react more aggressively
to problems in the banking sector. This result may need to be qualified
if these problems within the banking sector are generated endogenously
rather than being the result of exogenous shocks.
2 The structure of the model
In the economy, there are three types of agents: investors, banks (run by
bankmanagers) and entrepreneurs.All agents are risk neutral. The economy
extends over 3 periods. We assume that there is a continuum of investors
each initially (at t = 0) endowed with one unit of resources. The resource
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can be either stored (with a gross return equal to 1) or invested in the
form of bank equity or bank deposits. Using these funds, banks as financial
intermediaries can fund projects of entrepreneurs. There are two types i of
entrepreneurs (i = 1, 2), characterised by their projects return Ri. Project of
type 1 are realised early at period t = 1 with a safe return R1 > 1. Project of
type 2 give a higher return R2 > R1 > 1. With probability p, these projects
will also be realised at t = 1, but they may be delayed (with probability
1 − p) until t = 2. In the aggregate, the share p of type 2 projects will be
realised early. The aggregate share p, however is not known at t = 0. It will
be revealed between 0 and 1 at some intermediate period t = 12 . Investors
are impatient: They want to consume early (at t = 1). In contrast, both
entrepreneurs and bank managers are indifferent between consuming early
(t = 1) or late (t = 2).
Resources of investors are scarce in the sense that there are more projects
of each type available than the aggregate endowment of investors. Thus,
in the absence of commitment problems, total surplus would go to the
investors. In the absence of commitment problems, investors would simply
put all their funds in early projects and capture the full return. We take this
first-best market outcome as reference point and analyse those equilibria
coming closest to implement the market outcome.
Due to hold up problems as modelled in Hart & Moore (1994), en-
trepreneurs can only commit to pay a fraction γRi > 1 of their return.
Banks as financial intermediaries can pool investment; they also have supe-
rior collection skills (a higher γ). Following Diamond & Rajan (2001), banks
offer deposit contracts with a fixed payment d0 payable at any time after
t = 0 as a credible commitment device not to abuse their collection skills.
The threat of a bank run disciplines bank managers to fully pay out all
available resources pledged in the form of bank deposits. In the absence of
aggregate risk, financial intermediation via bank deposits can implement a
second best allocation, given the hold up problem posed by entrepreneurs.
Note that because of the hold up problem, entrepreneurs retain a rent
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— their share (1 − γ)Ri. Since early entrepreneurs are indifferent between
consuming at t = 1 or t = 2, they are willing to provide liquidity (using
their rent to buy equity shares and to deposit at banks at t = 1 at the market
rate r). Banks use the liquidity provided to pay out depositors. This way,
impatient investors can profit indirectly from investment in high yielding
long term projects. So banking allows transformation between liquid claims
and illiquid projects.
At date 0, banks competing for funds offer deposit contractswith payment
d0 and equity claims which maximise expected consumption of investors
at the given expected interest rates. Investors put their funds into those
assets promising the highest expected return among all assets offered. So in
equilibrium, expected return from deposits and equity must be equal across
all active banks. At date t = 1, banks and early entrepreneurs trade at a
perfect market for liquidity, clearing at interest rate r. As long as banks are
liquid, the payoff structure is described as in F 1.
Timing of the model: ࢖ࡸ  Liquidation at ࢚ ൌ ૙. ૞ 
       
ݐ ൌ 0  ݐ ൌ 0.5  ݐ ൌ 1 ݐ ൌ 2
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Fig. 1. Timing and payoff structure, when banks are liquid
Deposit contracts, however, introduce a fragile structure into the econ-
omy: Whenever depositors have doubts about their bank’s liquidity (the
ability to pay depositors the promised amount d0 at t = 1), they run the
bank early (they run already at the intermediate date t = 12 ), forcing the bank
to liquidate all its projects (even those funding safe early entrepreneurs) at
high costs: Early liquidation of projects gives only the inferior return c < 1.
We do not consider pure sunspot bank runs of the Diamond &Dybvig type.
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Insteadwe concentrate on runs happening if liquid funds (given the interest
rate r) are not sufficient to payout depositors.
If the share p of type 2 projects realised early is known at t = 0, there
is no aggregate uncertainty. Banks will invest such that — on aggregate —
they are able to fulfil depositor’s claims in period 1, so there will be no run.
But we are interested in the case of aggregate shocks. We model them in
the simplest way: the aggregate share of type 2 projects realised early can
take on just two values: either pH or pL with pH > pL. The “good”state with
a high share of early type 2 projects (the state with plenty of liquidity) will
be realised with probability pi. Note that the aggregate liquidity available
depends on the total share of funds invested in liquid type 1 projects. Let α
be this share. If α is so low that banks cannot honor deposits when pL occurs,
depositors will run at t = 12 . The payoff is captured in F 2.
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Fig. 2. Timing and payoff structure, when banks are illiquid
Given this structure, a bank seems to have just two op ions available: it
can either invest somuch in safe type 1 projects that it will be able to pay out
its depositors all the time (that is, even if the bad state occurs). Let us call
this share α(pL). Alternatively, it may invest just enough, α(pH), so as to pay
out depositors in the good state. If so, the bank will be run in the bad state.
Obviously, the optimal sh re depends on what other banks will do (since
that determines aggregate liquidity available at t = 1 and so the interest
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rate for liquid funds between period 1 and 2), but also on the probability pi
for the good state. To gain some intuition, let us first assume that all banks
behave the same — just as a representative bank. If so, it will not pay to
take precautions against the bad state if the likelihood for that outcome is
considered to be very low. Thus, if pi is very high, the representative bank
will obviously invest only a small share α(pH) — just enough to pay out
depositors in the good state. Alternatively, if pi is very low (close to 0), it
always pays to be prepared for the worst case, so the representative bank
will invest a high share α(pL) > α(pH) in safe projects. Since α(ps) is the share
invested in safe projects with return R1, the total payoff out of investment
strategy α(ps) is: E[Rs] = α(ps)R1 + [1 − α(ps)]R2 with E[RH] > E[RL].
With a high share α(pL) of safe projects, the banks will be able to pay
out depositors in all states. There will never be a bank run. So the expected
payoff for depositors isγE[RL] (assuming that the gross interest rate between
t = 1 and t = 2 is r = 1, which is the case maximising the investors payoffs).
With α(pH) there will be a bank run in the bad state, giving just the
bankruptcy payoff cwith probability 1−pi. So strategy α(pH) givespiγE[RH]+
(1 − pi)c. Depositors prefer α(pH), if piγE[RH] + (1 − pi)c > γE[RL] or
pi > pi2 =
γE[RL] − c
γE[RH] − c .
Obviously, for pi below pi2 depositors are better off with the safe strategy,
so they prefer banks to choose α(pL) rather than to exploit high profitability
of type 2 entrepreneurs. The intuition is straightforward:Whenpi is not high
enough, the high return R2 will come too late most of the time, triggering
frequent bank runs in period 1. So depositors rather prefer banks to play
the safe strategy in the range. In contrast, for pi > pi2 it would be socially
inefficient for private banks to hold enough liquid assets on their balance
sheets to prevent disaster when markets become disorderly. As long as all
banks play according to the strategies outlined above, depositors payoff is
characterised by the red line in F 3.
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Fig. 3. Depositors’ expected return
Central bank intervention could help to improve on that outcome. This is
easiest to see if deposit contracts are arranged in nominal terms. Consider
that the central bank injects liquidity in order to prevent bank runs if the
bad state (with low payoffs at t = 1) occurs. Following Allen & Gale (1998)
and Diamond & Rajan (2006), assume that the liquidity injection is done
such that the banks are able to honour their nominal contracts, reducing
the real value of deposits just to the amount of real resources available.
This intervention raises the real payoff of depositors compared to inefficient
liquidation, shifting the expected payoff of the risky strategy α(pH) to the
left (as indicated by the blue line in F 3). Essentially, nominal deposits
allow the central bank to implement state contingent payoffs as a public
good: The injection of additional liquidity helps to prevent bank runs.
In that sense, lender of last resort activity preventing costly bank runs
would definitely raise expected welfare, even though it increases the range
of parameter values with systemic risk: Anticipating central bank interven-
tion, banks would choose α(pH) for a wider range of pi: for pi > pi
′
2 rather
than for pi > pi2.
This reasoning seems to support the argument that lender of last resort
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indeed is a free lunch, providing a public good at no cost. Unfortunately, a
closer look at the equilibrium outcome tells us that this argument is wrong,
for the following reason:
Up to now, we simply assumed that all banks follow the same strategy,
maximising depositor’s payoff. When all banks choose the strategy α(pL),
there will be excess liquidity at t = 1 if the good state occurs (with a large
share of type 2 projects realised early). A bank anticipating this event has
a strong incentive to invest all their funds in type 2 projects, reaping the
benefit of excess liquidity in the good state. As long as the music is playing,
such a deviating bank gets up and dances. Having invested in high yielding
projects, the dancing bank can always credibly extract entrepreneur’s excess
liquidity at t = 1, promising to pay back at t = 2 out of highly profitable
projects. After all, at that stage, this bank, free riding on liquidity, can offer
a capital cushion with expected returns well above what prudent banks
are able to promise. Of course, if the bad state happens, there is no excess
liquidity. The “dancing”banks would just bid up the interest rates, urgently
trying to get funds. Rational depositors, anticipating that these banks won’t
succeed, will already trigger a bank run on these banks at t = 12 .
When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things get complicated. As
long as dancing banks are not supported in the bad state, they are driven out
of the market, providing just the return c. Nevertheless, a bank free riding
on liquidity in the good state can on average offer the attractive return
piγR2 + (1 − pi)c as expected payoff for depositors. Thus, a free riding bank
will always be able to outbid a prudent bank whenever the probability pi
for the good state is not too low. The condition is
pi > pi1 =
γE[RL] − c
γR2 − c .
Since R2 > E[RH], it pays to dance within the range pi1 ≤ pi < pi2.
Obviously, there cannot be equilibrium in pure strategies. As long as
the music is playing, all banks would like to get up and dance. But then,
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there would be no prudent bank left providing the liquidity needed to be
able to dance. In the resulting mixed strategy equilibrium, a proportion of
banks behave prudent, investing some amount αs < α(pL) in liquid assets,
whereas the rest free rides on liquidity in the good state, choosing α = 0.
Prudent banks reduce αs < α(pL) in order to cut down the opportunity cost
of investing in safe projects. Interest rates and αs adjust such that depositors
are indifferent between the two types of banks. At t = 0, both prudent and
dancing banks offer the same expected return to depositors. The proportion
of free-riding banks is determined by aggregate market clearing conditions
in both states. Dancing banks are run for sure in the bad state, but the high
return R2 > E[Rs] compensates depositors for that risk.
As shown in P 2.1, free-riding drives down the return for
investors. They are definitely worse off than if all banks would coordinate
on the prudent strategy α(pL). As illustrated in F 4, the effective return
on deposits for investors deteriorates in the range pi1 ≤ pi < pi2 as a result of
free riding behaviour.
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Fig. 4. Depositors’ expected return with free-riding
Proposition 2.1 In the mixed strategy equilibrium, investors are worse off than if
all banks would coordinate on the prudent strategy α(pL). 2
Proof See A A.1. 2
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3 Central bank intervention
The crucial challenge is to characterise the adequate policy responsewhen
systemic liquidity risk is endogenous. The problem is that this event is likely
to result in second or rather third best options, for the simple reason that
liquidity provision usually has to copewith a combination of different types
of externalities. As illustrated in F 3, a lender of last resort preventing
inefficient costly liquidation could improve upon the allocation as long as
its actions would not have an impact on the amount of aggregate liquidity
provided by the private sector itself. The incentive for free riding prevalent
in modern times of competitive financial markets, however, complicates
the picture dramatically. In the model presented, a lender of last resort,
providing liquidity support to the market requesting good collateral as the
only condition, will drive out all prudent banks. Just as in Gresham’s law, all
banks are encouraged to dance, knowing that they can get liquidity support
against good collateral. The public provision of emergency liquidity results
in serious moral hazard. It’s as simple as that.
Proposition 3.1 Assume that pipHR2 + (1 − pi)c ≥ 1 and that for pi ∈ (pi1, pi2),
d j0 = γR2 > pipHR2 + (1 − pi)c. If the central bank is willing to provide liquidity to
the entire market in times of crisis, all banks have an incentive to dance, choosing
α j = 0. 2
Proof See A A.2. 2
The reason for this surprising result is the following: By purpose, we
concentrate on the case of pure illiquidity risk. In our model, the liquidity
shock just retards the realisation of high yielding projects: In the end (at
t = 2), all projects will certainly be realised. So there is no doubt about
solvency of the projects, unless insolvency is triggered by illiquidity. Central
bank support against allegedly good collateral, creating artificial liquidity
at the drop of a hat, destroys all private incentives to care about ex ante
liquidity provision. The key problemwith the Bagehot principle here is that
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dancing banks do invest in projects with higher return, as long as they have
not to be terminated. In reality, there is no clear-cut distinction between
insolvency and illiquidity. We leave it to future research to allow for the risk
of insolvency. But we doubt that our basic argument will be affected.
So what policy options should be taken? One might argue that a central
bank shouldprovide liquidity support only toprudent banks (so conditional
on banks having invested sufficiently in liquid assets). As shown in Cao &
Illing (2007), such a policy may improve the allocation at least to some
extent. But as we argued, such a commitment is simply not credible: There
is a serious problem of dynamic consistency.
Rather than relying on an implausible commitment mechanism, the obvi-
ous solution would be a mix between two instruments. It seems to be rather
surprising that perceivedwisdom argues that central banks can pursue both
price stability and financial stability using just one tool, interest rate policy.
Instead, in a first step, a banking regulator would have to impose ex ante
liquidity requirements. Requesting minimum investment in liquid type 1
assets of at leastα(pL) forpi < pi
′
2would help to implement the second best ef-
ficient allocation as characterised in F 3. Such a rulewould be sufficient
to get rid of incentives for free riding. For pi > pi′2, requesting liquid assets as
low as α(pH) would be sufficient. Given that the ex ante imposed liquidity
requirements have been fulfilled, ex post the central bank can safely play
its role as lender in the range pi > pi′2 whenever the bad state turns out to be
realised.
The key task for regulators and the central bank is to cope with free
riding incentives. An alternative mechanism compared to ex ante liquidity
regulation, the central bank might commit to try to mop up the excess
liquidity available in the good state. If that can be done, potential free riders
would have no chance to survive. We doubt, however, that the central will
be able to implement such a policy.
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As further alternative, one might impose narrow banking in the sense
that banks are required to hold sufficient liquid funds so as to pay out in
all contingencies. Finally, one might expect that imposing equity or capital
requirements are sufficient to provide a cushion against liquidity shocks.
Both these options turn out to be equivalent within our simple two state
model. As the next section shows, they are strictly worse than imposing
minimum liquidity standards ex ante combined with lender of last resort
policy and are even likely to be inferior relative to the outcome of a mixed
strategy equilibrium with free riding (dancing) banks.
4 The role of equity
Let us now introduce capital requirements in the model, i.e. banks are
required to hold some equities in their assets. Keep the same settings as
before with the presence of aggregate uncertainty, except that instead of
pure fixed deposit contract, the banks issue a mixture of deposit contract
and equity for the investors (Diamond & Rajan, 2000, 2005, 2006). To make
it clear, equity is a claim that can be renegotiated such that the bankers and
the capital holders (here the investors) split the residual surplus after the
deposit contract has been paid. The mixture of deposit contract and equity
seems to be a quite artificial setting at the first sight. But actually it turns
out to be a convenient modelling device. In particular, in the symmetric
equilibria of the banks, such a mixture will exactly be the portfolio held by
a representative agent out of the homogenous investors. In other words,
whenever investors are homogenous, it’s not necessary to separate equity
holders from the depositors.
Capital (equity) can reduce the fragility, but it allows the bank manager
to capture a rent. Being a renegotiatable claim, equity is always subject to
the hold-up problem, i.e. equity holders can only get a share of ζ (ζ ∈ [0, 1])
from the surplus. To make it simpler, in the following we simply assume
that ζ = 12 .
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With ζ = 12 the bankers get a rent of
γE[R]−d0
2 , sharing the surplus over
deposits equally with the equity holders. Suppose that all the banks have to
meet the level of equity k which comes from the central bank’s regulatory
rules, then if a bank i is not run k is defined as
k =
γE[Rs,i]−d0,i
2
γE[Rs,i]−d0,i
2 + d0,i
in which Rs,i is bank i’s return achieved under state s.
One additional, but crucial assumptions concerning timing are that (1)
the dividend of the equity is paid after the payment of d0,i and (2) capital
requirement has to be met till the last minute before the dividend payment
— This deters the bankers’ incentive to transfer their dividend income to
the investors ex post, which increases d0,i ex ante.
Solve for d0,i to get
d0,i =
1 − k
1 + k
γE[Rs,i].
Then one would ask: Under what conditions would it make sense to
introduce equity requirements? It is easy to see that introducing equity
will definitely reduce welfare in the absence of aggregate risk. Somewhat
counterintuitive, capital requirements even reduces the share α invested in
the safe project in that case. The reason is that with equity, bankers get a
rent of γE[R]−d02 , sharing the surplus over deposits equally with the equity
holders. So investors providing funds in form of both deposits and equity
to the banks will get out at t = 1 just 11+kγE[R] < γE[R]. Since return at t = 2
is higher than at t = 1, bankers prefer to consume late, so the amount of
resources needed at t = 1 is lower in the presence of equity. Consequently,
the share α will be reduced. Of course, banks holding no equity provide
more attractive conditions for investors, so equity could not survive. This at
first sight counterintuitive result simply demonstrates that there is no role
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(or rather only a welfare reducing role) for capital holding in the absence of
aggregate risk.
But when there is aggregate risk, equity helps to absorb the aggregate
shock. In the simple 2-state set up, equity holdings need to be just sufficient
to cushion the bad state. So with equity, the bank will chose α∗ = α
(
pH
)
. The
level of equity k needs to be so high that, given α∗ = α
(
pH
)
, the bank just
stays solvent in the bad state — it is just able to payout the fixed claims of
depositors, whereas all equity will be wiped out.
With equity k, the total amount that can be pledged to both depositors
and equity in the good state is 11+kγE[RH] with claims of depositors being
d0 = 1−k1+kγE[RH] and equity EQ =
k
1+kγE[RH]. In the bad state, a marginally
solvent bank can pay out to depositors d0 = α
(
pH
)
R1 +
(
1 − α (pH)) pLR2. So
k is determined by the condition:
1 − k
1 + k
γE[RH] = α
(
pH
)
R1 +
(
1 − α (pH)) pLR2,
and solve to get
k =
γE[RH] − d0
γE[RH] + d0
. (1)
It’s observed that k is decreasing in pL: the higher pL, the lower the equity
k needed to stay solvent in the bad state. k = 0 for pL = pH, and for pL close
to pH equity holding is superior to the strategy α∗ = α
(
pH
)
. That is if
d0 ≥ γE[RH]pi + (1 − pi)c.
Such (d0, k) is the equilibrium for the banks. The reason is easy to see: First,
no banks are willing to set higher ki — because equity holding is costly and
she is not able to compete the other banks for
(
d0,i, ki
)
; Second, no banks are
able to set higher d0,i given (d0, k) set by all the other banks — because k has
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to be met when d0,i is paid, the only thing the deviator can do is to bid up
interest rate and this leads to bank runs across the whole banking industry
— the deviation is not profitable.
From the regulator’s point of view, the unique optimal equity requirement
k it imposes is exactly the k determined by condition (1), which is so high
that the bank just stays solvent in the bad state— it is just able to payout the
fixed claims of depositors, whereas all equity will be wiped out. The reason
is simple: Since equity holding is costly, the only reason for the central bank
to make it sensible is to eliminate the costly bank run. Therefore neither too
low k (which is purely a cost and doesn’t prevent any bank run) nor too high
k (which prevent bank runs, but incurs a too high cost of holding capital) is
optimal. Thus from now on we can concentrate on such level of k without
loss of generality.
Now the interesting question is: Can capital requirement improve the
allocation in this economy, in comparison to the laissez-faire outcome we
studied before?
Definition Define a representative depositor’s expected return function
without equity requirements as Π(pi, ·), such that
Π(pi, ·) =

γE[RL], if pi ∈ [0, pi1] ;
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pLR2, if pi ∈ (pi1, pi2) ;
γE[RH]pi + (1 − pi)c, if pi ∈ [pi2, 1]
and her expected return function under equity requirements as Πe(pi, ·), as
well as the set S in which the depositor’s welfare is improved under equity
requirement, such that
S := {pˆi|Πe(pˆi, ·) ≥ Π(pˆi, ·)} . 2
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Fig. 5. Expected return with /without equity — Case 1
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Fig. 6. Expected return with /without equity — Case 2
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Fig. 7. Expected return with /without equity — Case 3
The blue lines of F 5 describe the laissez-faire outcome Π(pi, ·), and
the red line shows the depositors expected return Πe(pi, ·) = d0 + Π2 under
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capital requirement, which consists of two terms:
• The deposit payment d0;
• The dividend of equity holdings Π2 , which is only achieved in the good
state, and its value is determined by
Π
2
=
γE[RH] − d0
2
=
γE[RH] − 1−k1+kγE[RH]
2
=
k
1 + k
γE[RH].
Denote the intersection of Πe(pi, ·) = d0 + Π2 and γE[RL] by A, which is
equal to (see A A.4 for detail)
A =
2(R1 − pLR2)
(1 − γ)R1 + (γ − pL)R2 ,
as well as the intersection of Πe(pi, ·) = d0 + Π2 and γE[RH]pi + (1 − pi)c by B,
which is equal to (see A A.4 for detail)
B =
2
[
(1 − γ)(cR1 − pLR1R2) + (γ − pH)(cR2 − R1R2)]
2(1 − γ)cR1 + 2(γ − pH)cR2 + [γ(pH − 1) − (γ − pH) − (1 − γ)pL]R1R2 .
Now it’s straight forward to compare investor’s payoff under equity re-
quirements with the laissez faire free riding equilibrium for some extreme
values:
Lemma 4.1 The depositors’ expected return under equity requirement is lower
than the laissez-faire outcome when pi = 0 or pi = 1. 2
Proof See A A.3. 2
The intuition of L 4.1 is straight forward: There is no uncertainty
when pi = 0 or pi = 1, so it’s inferior to hold costly equities as we already
explained before.
Then P 4.2 characterizes thewelfare improvement of introduc-
ing equity requirements.
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Proposition 4.2 Given equity requirement k imposed by the regulator,
• When A ∈ (0, pi1], i.e.(
2γR2 − γE[RH] − d0) (γE[RL] − d0) + (2γE[RL] − γE[RH] − d0) (d0 − c) ≤ 0,
then S = [A,B] ⊇ [pi1, pi2];
• When A ∈ (pi1, pi2], i.e.(
2γR2 − γE[RH] − d0) (γE[RL] − d0) + (2γE[RL] − γE[RH] − d0) (d0 − c) > 0,
and
γ (E[RH] − E[RL]) (d0 − c) ≥ (γE[RH] − c) (γE[RL] − d0) ,
then S = [p˜i,B] in which p˜i ∈ (pi1, pi2] and S⋂ [pi1, pi2] = [p˜i, pi2];
• When A ∈ (pi2, 1], i.e.
2
(
γE[RL] − d0) (γE[RH] − c) ≥ (γE[RH] − d0) (γE[RL] − c) ,
then S ⊆ [p˜i,B] in which p˜i ∈ (pi1, pi2] and S⋂ [pi1, pi2] = [p˜i, pi2]. 2
Proof See A A.4. 2
The three possible cases are characterised in F 5, 6 and 7, respectively.
Numerical examples simulating these cases are presented in the A
B.
Equity requirements give investors a higher payoff than the laissez-faire
market outcome whenever their payoff with a safe bank holding sufficient
equity exceeds the payoff of the mixed strategy equilibriumwith free riding
banks for all parameter values. This case is captured as case 1, shown in
F 5. Since free riding partly destroys the value of deposits held by
prudent banks (forcing them to hold a riskier portfolio), it seems obvious
that imposing equity requirements will always dominate the laissez-faire
outcome with mixed strategies. Unfortunately, this need not be the case. It
is quite likely that equity requirements result in inferior payoffs for some
range of parameter values (as shown in case 2— see F 6). It might even
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be that imposing equity requirements makes investors worse than laissez-
faire for all parameter values. This is shown in F 7, representing case
3.
The intuition behind this at first surprising result is that holding equity
can be quite costly; if so, it may be superior to accept the fact that systemic
risk is a price to be paid for higher returns on average. It should be evident
that narrow banking (imposing the requirement that banks hold sufficient
equity so as to be able to pay out demand deposits in all states of the world)
can be quite inferior: If the bad state is a rare probability event, it simply
makes no sense to dispense with all the efficiency gains out of banking with
deposit contracts.
The mix of liquidity requirements with lender of last resort policy is
always dominating equity requirements. See F 8. The reason is as
following: Consider that the banks are required to hold α = α(pH) when pi is
high. Then when pH reveals, the investor’s real return is γE[RH]; and when
pL reveals, the investor’s real return is α(pH)R1 + (1 − α(pH))pLR2. Therefore
the investor’s overall expected return turns out to be
Πm = γE[RH]pi + (1 − pi) [α(pH)R1 + (1 − α(pH))pLR2] ,
which is linear in pi, as the green line of F 8 shows. Note that when pi =
1,Πm = γE[RH] > d0+Π2 ; andwhenpi = 0,Πm = α(pH)R1+(1−α(pH))pLR2 = d0.
Therefore, Πm line is above d0 + Π2 , ∀pi ∈ (0, 1], i.e. the mix of liquidity
requirements with lender of last resort policy is always dominating equity
requirements when aggregate uncertainty exists.
In our simple model with just two feasible aggregate states, narrow bank-
ing is equivalent to imposing equity requirements. After all, the only role for
equity here is to provide a cushion in the bad state of the world. Things get
more interesting in a realistic setting with a continuous probability distribu-
tion. In that case, narrow banking would boil down to requiring sufficient
equity even for the worst case, whereas equity requirements allow much
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Fig. 8. Expected return with credible liquidity injections (for the case of F B.3)
more flexibility, taking precautions for the most likely events. To analyse
that issue is left for future research.
5 Conclusion
Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks have been modelled as exoge-
nous events. In this paper, we derive the aggregate share of liquid projects
endogenously. It depends on the incentives of financial intermediaries to in-
vest in risky, illiquidprojects. This endogeneity allowsus to capture the feed-
back between financial market regulation and incentives of private banks,
determining the aggregate amount of liquidity available.
We model (real) illiquidity in the following way: liquid projects are re-
alised early. Illiquid projects promise a higher return, but a stochastic frac-
tion of these type of projects will be realised late. We concentrate on pure
illiquidity risk: Therewill never be insolvency unless triggered by illiquidity
(by a bank run). Financial intermediaries choose the share invested in high
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yielding but less liquid assets. As a consequence of limited liability, banks
are encouraged to free ride on liquidity provision. Relying on sufficient
liquidity provided by the market, they are inclined to invest excessively in
illiquid long term projects.
Liquidity provision by central banks can help to prevent bank runs with
inefficient early liquidation. In Cao & Illing (2007), we showed that the
anticipation of unconditional liquidity provision results in overinvestment
in risky activities (moral hazard), creating excessive systemic risk.
Extending our previous work, this paper analyses the adequate policy
response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk, providing a cost / benefit
analysis of different forms of banking regulation to better to understand
what type of intervention is required.We explicitly compare the impact both
of liquidity and capital requirements. We show that it is crucial for efficient
lender of last resort policy to impose ex ante minimum liquidity standards
for banks. In addition, we analyse the impact of equity requirements and
narrow banking in the following sense: banks are required to hold sufficient
liquid funds so as to pay out in all contingencies. We prove that such a
policy is strictly inferior to imposing minimum liquidity standards ex ante
combined with lender of last resort policy. It is even likely to be inferior
relative to the outcome of a mixed strategy equilibrium with free riding
banks.
In our model with just two feasible aggregate states, narrow banking is
equivalent to imposing equity requirements. The only role for equity here is
to provide a cushion in the bad state of the world. In a realistic setting with
a continuous probability distribution, narrow banking would boil down to
requiring sufficient equity even for the worst case, whereas equity require-
ments allow more flexibility. We leave it for future research to analyse that
issue. Following Diamond & Rajan (2006), we model financial intermedia-
tion via traditional banks offering fragile deposit contracts. Systemic risk is
triggered by bank runs. In modern economies, a significant part of interme-
diation is provided by the shadow banking sector. These institutions (like
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hedge funds and investment banks) are not financed via deposits, but they
are highly leveraged. Incentives to dance (to free ride on liquidity provision)
seem to be even stronger for the shadow banking industry. So imposing liq-
uidity requirements only for the banking sector will not be sufficient to cope
with free riding. In future work, we plan to analyse incentives for leveraged
institutions within our framework.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of P 2.1
The mixed strategy equilibrium is characterised as P 2 of Cao
& Illing (2007). By chooseing α∗s a prudent bank should have equal return at
both states, ds0 = d
s
0(pH) = d
s
0(pL), i.e.
γ
[
α∗sR1 + (1 − α∗s)pHR2 +
(1 − α∗s)(1 − pH)R2
rH
]
=γ
[
α∗sR1 + (1 − α∗s)pLR2 +
(1 − α∗s)(1 − pL)R2
rL
]
.
With some simple algebra this is equivalent to
1
rH
=
1 − pL
1 − pH
1
rL
− pH − pL
1 − pH .
Plot 1rH as a function of
1
rL
as F A.1x shows:
The slope 1−pL1−pH > 1 and intercept −
pH−pL
1−pH < 0, and the line goes through
(1, 1). But rH = rL = 1 cannot be equilibrium outcome here, because α(pL)
is dominant strategy in this case and subject to deviation. So whenever
rH > 1 (suppose 1rH = A in the graph), there must be rH > rL > 1 (because
1
rH
< 1rL = B < 1).
At pL, given that rL > 1 the prudent bank’s return is equal to ds0 =
κ(α∗s(pL, rL)) < κ(α(pL)), since the latter maximises the bank’s expected re-
turn with r∗ = 1 by L 2 of Cao & Illing (2007). Therefore in the mixed
strategy equilibrium, investors are worse off than if all banks would coor-
dinate on the prudent strategy α(pL). 2
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Fig. A.1. Higher interest rates in the mixed strategy equilibrium
A.2 Proof of P 3.1
Suppose that a representative bank chooses to be prudent with αi = α,
and promises a nominal deposit contract di0 = γ
[
αR1 + (1 − α)R2
]
in order to
maximize its investors return. Then when the bad state with high liquidity
needs is realized, the central bank has to inject enough liquidity into the
market to keep interest rate at r = 1 in order to ensure bank i’s survival.
However, given r = 1, a naughty bank j can always profit from setting
α j = 0, promising the nominal return d
j
0 = γR2 > d
i
0 to its investors. Thus,
surely the banks refer to play naughty.
For those parameter values such that pipHR2 + (1 − pi)c < 1 there exists no
equilibrium with liquidity injection. The reaso is the following:
(1) Any symmetric strategic profile cannot be equilibrium, because
(a) If there is no trade under such strategic profile, i.e. α is so small
that the real return is less than 1, one bank can deviate by setting
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α = 1 and trading with investors;
(b) If there is trade under such strategic profile, i.e. α > 0 for all the
banks, then one bank can deviate by setting α = 0 and getting
higher nominal return than the other banks.
(2) Any asymmetric strategic profile, or profile of mixed strategies, cannot
be equilibrium, because
(a) If there is no trade under such strategic profile, then the argument
of 1 a) applies here;
(b) If there is trade under such strategic profile, then one bank can
deviate by choosing a pure strategy, α = 0, and get better off —
there is no reason to mix with the other dominated strategies. 2
A.3 Proof of L 4.1
When pi = 0,
d0 +
Π
2
· 0=α (pH)R1 + (1 − α (pH)) pLR2
<α
(
pL
)
R1 +
(
1 − α (pL)) pLR2
=γE[RL];
When pi = 1,
d0 +
Π
2
=
α
(
pH
)
R1 +
(
1 − α (pH)) pLR2 + α (pH)R1 + (1 − α (pH)) pHR2
2
<α
(
pH
)
R1 +
(
1 − α (pH)) pHR2
=γE[RH]. 2
A.4 Proof of P 4.2
Generically, there are three cases concerning the relative positions of
Π(pi, ·) and Πe(pi, ·):
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(1) As F 5 shows, the intersection A lies between 0 and pi1;
(2) As F 6 shows, the intersection A lies between pi1 and pi2;
(3) As F 7 shows, the intersection A lies between pi2 and 1.
The intersection A takes the value of pi, such that
γE[RL] = d0 +
Π
2
.
Solve to get
A =
2
(
γE[RL] − d0)
γE[RH] − d0 =
2(R1 − pLR2)
(1 − γ)R1 + (γ − pL)R2 .
The intersection B takes the value of pi, such that
γE[RH]pi + (1 − pi)c = d0 + Π2 .
Solve to get
B=
d0 − c
γE[RH]+d0
2 − c
=
2
[
(1 − γ)(cR1 − pLR1R2) + (γ − pH)(cR2 − R1R2)]
2(1 − γ)cR1 + 2(γ − pH)cR2 + [γ(pH − 1) − (γ − pH) − (1 − γ)pL]R1R2 .
Then the set S can be determined in each case:
(1) As F 5 shows, when A ∈ (0, pi1],
2
(
γE[RL] − d0)
γE[RH] − d0 ≤ pi1 =
γE[RL] − c
γR2 − c ,
rearrange to get(
2γR2 − γE[RH] − d0) (γE[RL] − d0) + (2γE[RL] − γE[RH] − d0) (d0 − c)
≤ 0.
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Since Πe(pi, ·) is strictly increasing in pi, then
Πe(pi, ·)|pi=B > Πe(pi, ·)|pi=A ≥ γE[RL]|pi=pi1 =
(
γE[RH]pi + (1 − pi)c) |pi=pi2
≥Π(pi, ·)|pi∈[pi1,pi2],
which implies S = [A,B] ⊇ [pi1, pi2];
(2) As F 6 shows, when A ∈ (pi1, pi2],
pi1 =
γE[RL] − c
γR2 − c <
2
(
γE[RL] − d0)
γE[RH] − d0 ,
rearrange to get(
2γR2 − γE[RH] − d0) (γE[RL] − d0) + (2γE[RL] − γE[RH] − d0) (d0 − c)
> 0.
What’s more, in this case B ∈ [pi2, 1], and this is equivalent to
γE[RL] − c
γE[RH] − c = pi2 <
d0 − c
γE[RH]+d0
2 − c
,
rearrange to get
γ (E[RH] − E[RL]) (d0 − c) ≥ (γE[RH] − c) (γE[RL] − d0) .
Similarly,
Πe(pi, ·)|pi≤A ≤ γE[RL]|pi=pi1 =
(
γE[RH]pi + (1 − pi)c) |pi=pi2 ≤ Π(pi, ·)|pi∈[pi2,B]
≤Πe(pi, ·)|pi≥B,
which implies S = [p˜i,B] in which p˜i ∈ (pi1, pi2] and S⋂ [pi1, pi2] = [p˜i, pi2];
(3) As F 7 shows, when A ∈ (pi2, 1],
pi2 =
γE[RL] − c
γE[RH] − c <
2
(
γE[RL] − d0)
γE[RH] − d0 ,
rearrange to get
2
(
γE[RL] − d0) (γE[RH] − c) ≥ (γE[RH] − d0) (γE[RL] − c) .
Similarly,
Πe(pi, ·)|pi≤B < Πe(pi, ·)|pi≥A ≤ γE[RL]|pi=pi1 =
(
γE[RH]pi + (1 − pi)c) |pi=pi2 ,
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which implies S ⊆ [p˜i,B] in which p˜i ∈ (pi1, pi2] and S⋂ [pi1, pi2] =
[p˜i, pi2]. 2
B Results of numerical simulations
The following figures present numerical simulations representing the
three different cases.
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Fig. B.1. Expected return with / without equity, with pH = 0.3, pL = 0.25, γ = 0.6,
R1 = 1.8, R2 = 5.5, c = 0.9
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Fig. B.2. Expected return with / without equity, with pH = 0.4, pL = 0.3, γ = 0.6,
R1 = 2, R2 = 4, c = 0.8
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Fig. B.3. Expected return with / without equity, with pH = 0.5, pL = 0.25, γ = 0.7,
R1 = 1.8, R2 = 2.5, c = 0
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